AI Personality and Halakhic Ethics

by R. Gil Student

OpenAI recently released ChatGPT-5, which faced a number of public challenges. One of its features is that users can now choose from five preset Artificial Intelligence (AI) “personalities.” The list of personalities includes cheerful and adaptive; thoughtful and supportive; exploratory and enthusiastic; efficient and blunt; and, most provocatively, critical and sarcastic. In other words, you can now speak to an AI designed to respond with skepticism, sarcasm and biting commentary.

This raises an ethical and halakhic question. If AI is only code generating text, do its character traits matter? Or can it subtly influence us, shaping how we speak and even how we think?

I. Growth and Influence

Human beings are social creatures who continually evolve, with their thoughts and actions shaped in part by the company they keep and the models they observe. In order to grow in the right direction, we must surround ourselves with positive role models. Rambam vividly explains the proper attitude to this psychological reality (Mishneh Torah, Hilkhos De’os 6:1):

“It is natural for one’s character traits (de’os) and actions (ma’asim) to be influenced by friends and companions and for one to follow the local norms of behavior. Therefore a person must associate with the righteous and constantly sit with the wise in order to learn from their deeds. And he should distance himself from the wicked who walk in darkness so that he will not learn from their deeds.”

This statement is not just general guidance but has specific practical implications. For example, Rav Shlomo Aviner (cont., Israel) writes in a responsum that Israelis should not spend extended time in India after their army service because, among other reasons, it involves being in close quarters with non-religious and non-Jewish people whose behaviors can have a profound negative influence (Responsa She’eilas Shlomo 4:246). Similarly, Rav Shlomo Min Hahar (20th cen., Israel), in his 1971 halakhic guide for IDF soldiers (Dinei Tzava U-Milchamah, par. 5) cautions that they should not spend downtime with non-religious soldiers because of the potential impact on their spiritual character.

However, a subtle shift in Rambam’s language might have significant relevance for our question. He begins with both de’os and ma’asim—attitudes, dispositions, character traits and deeds, behavior, actions. He concludes that we must keep company with the righteous and avoid the wicked because of their deeds. Why the move from traits to behaviors?

II. The Power of Traits

Given the context of Hilkhos De’os, which discusses the proper character traits, it is difficult to sustain the argument that halakhah primarily governs what we do, not what we silently feel. It seems more likely that Rambam frames the issue in behavioral terms because character traits are abstract until they appear in conduct. A selfish attitude becomes contagious when it is displayed in action. It is true that we must be worried about adopting the unhealthy character traits of those who surround us. However, Rambam highlights actions because generally they are the vehicle through which traits spread.

Alternatively, perhaps Rambam feels that from a practical standpoint, we need only be concerned with being influenced by other people’s concrete bad deeds and not their intangible attitudes. We cannot be influenced materially by the thoughts inside other people’s hearts. Our focus must be on maintaining positive deeds, which will in turn sustain positive attitudes. If we take care to avoid unhealthy actions, we will avoid being influenced by other people’s negative character traits.

This last approach raises the important question: if Rambam focuses on actions, does that mean that we need not worry about being influenced by other people’s traits if they are not translated into action?

The Gemara (Shabbos 33a) teaches that one who merely hears nibul peh, vulgar or profane speech, is punished. He himself did not speak improperly. However, the words alone, encountered passively, carry moral harm. This text implies that exposure to speech itself, without physical action, can corrode character. Even language divorced from deed conveys a personality trait and influences the listener. If vulgar speech damages, then cynicism, sarcasm or arrogance transmitted in words can also damage.

III. AI and Character

With this in mind, we can return to our discussion of AI personalities. A human being has both traits and behaviors with influence often flowing through deeds that then shape traits. An AI chatbot has no deeds; it does not act in the world. Its entire presence is in speech.

This means that the danger lies not in AI’s actions, because it has none, but in its simulated traits. An AI cynic models cynicism. An AI with a sharp tongue normalizes sarcasm. A dismissive or arrogant personality slowly habituates its users to those same traits.

Must we worry about AI’s corrosive influence on character traits? This seems to depend on how we understand Rambam’s shift in language from de’os and ma’asim, traits and actions, to just ma’asim, actions. If we believe that Rambam is concerned for both but focuses on actions because generally that is how attitudes are transmitted, then we must avoid a chatbot’s corrosive speech. On the other hand, if Rambam only warns us about learning from others’ negative deeds because attitudes are not transmittable, then we need not be concerned about an AI chatbot’s personality.

A third possibility is that speech constitutes action. Traditionally, there is a debate whether speech rises to the level of action. For example, the Torah forbids muzzling a working animal to prevent it from eating (Deut. 25:4). If you effectively muzzle an animal by verbally berating it, R. Yochanan says you violated the prohibition through speech while Resh Lakish says that speech does not constitute action (Bava Metzi’a 90b). Tosafos (ad loc., s.v. R. Yochanan) quote a number of relevant texts regarding whether speech constitutes action and conclude that speech constitutes action if it yields tangible results, like an animal refraining from eating. In our case, it seems farfetched to say that an AI’s words lead to action and therefore that the speech constitutes action.

IV. Practical Implications

The upshot is that creators of AI tools, particularly but not exclusively for Jewish use, must design them to speak with derekh eretz and kavod, manners and respect. AI must model responsible behavior so it becomes a positive, and certainly not a negative, influence.

When this is not the case, according to one reading of Rambam, we are instructed to distance ourselves from bad influence. Choosing a sarcastic or cynical AI personality is no different from choosing friends who mock and belittle. Even if the AI is only computer code, the influence of its words is real. Interacting daily with an AI cynic or a sarcastic assistant risks habituating yourself to bad traits. This is not harmless fun; it is a steady shaping of character.

Rambam writes above that “a person must associate with the righteous and constantly sit with the wise.” Today, that advice applies not only to our neighbors and friends but also to the personalities we allow into our lives electronically. AI can be a tool for Torah and personal growth but only if it speaks with dignity and refinement. Otherwise, it becomes a daily tutor in bad midos.