Questioning the Question of Questions II

by R. Jonah Steinmetz

The Permissibility and Purpose of the Tzadik v’Ra Lo Query

(continued from here)

III. RAMBAN’S APPROACH TO TZADIK V’RA LO

Tzadik She’eino Gamur

As noted, the Gemara (Berachos 7a) records Moshe’s request for an understanding of the enigma of Tzadik v’ra lo. The Gemara assumes he was answered and proceeds to discuss the details of God’s response. It is initially suggested that God responded that tzadik v’ra lo is a case in which the afflicted tzadik is the descendant of wicked people; the rasha v’tov lo is a wicked individual who descends from righteous ancestors. However, the Gemara promptly rejects this approach, for children cannot be punished for the actions of their parents, unless they uphold the same evil practices.

As such, the Gemara suggests a different answer: tzadik she’eino gamur and rasha she’eino gamur. The tzadik who undergoes suffering is not a complete tzadik, rather he has flaws for which he deserves retribution. Likewise, the perceived rasha has some merits which are repaid in this world.

Understandably, Ramban mainly focuses on this final answer of the Gemara. He explains that the tzadik’s minimal misdeeds are punished in this world so as to guarantee and secure his ultimate next-worldly reward for his overwhelmingly righteous life. The afflictions, then, are not unwarranted, but rather punishment for the slight missteps of the incomplete tzadik.

Yisurin Shel Ahavah

Although he addresses them in two separate stages in Shaar HaGemul, Ramban’s approach to tzadik v’ra lo is consistent with his explanation of the concept of yisurin shel ahavah – afflictions of love. The Gemara (Berachos 5a) teaches that if a person sees afflictions visited upon him, he should examine his ways and attempt to identify (and resolve) his sins. If his search yields no recognition of sin, he should attribute his suffering to inactive violations, namely, a disregard for positive mitzvos (bitul mitzvos aseh).^[1]The Gemara points to bitul Torah in this case. Whereas others understand the Gemara to be saying that the individual can attribute his suffering to the particular sin of bitul Torah (see, for … Continue reading If it should happen that he has never so much as missed an opportunity to fulfill a positive commandment, he can rest assured that he is experiencing “yisurin shel ahavah.”

Rashi (ibid.) explains that the afflictions are due to God’s love for this individual. He tortures him so as to increase his ultimate reward in the world to come. While Rambam understands this Gemara in an identical fashion, he rejects it, claiming it is inconceivable and thus certainly not representative of the mainstream opinion in Jewish thought.^[2]See Moreh Nevuchim (3:24). Rambam argues that it is very difficult to assume a God whose ways are just and free of any perversion should punish someone undeservedly, even if it results in boosted reward in olam habah.

Ramban similarly cannot tolerate such an opinion. Due to the difficulty, however, he rejects this interpretation of the Gemara entirely and suggests an alternative understanding. Ramban interprets yisurin shel ahavah not as baseless suffering but rather as punishment for sins for which a person simply cannot account. Some transgressions are so minor or so tangential that they remain overlooked, no matter how scrutinous a self-examination is performed. The crime may have been performed so unknowingly that the possibility of recognition and repentance is essentially precluded. Ramban notes that the unwitting sinner still needs atonement, either on account of his negligence, or due to the metaphysical damage caused to him by the objective performance of sin. It is as atonement for these misdeeds that yisurin shel ahavah are visited upon a person.^[3]Ramban does note that there do exist certain inconsequential afflictions which are not attributable to any sins. Everyday aches and pains – “ההוים בנוהג של עולם, והבאין על … Continue reading

These punishments are referred to as “yisurin shel ahavah” because it is out of His great love for man that God offers the opportunity to cleanse oneself even from unknown transgression. It is a great gift on His part to afford us atonement even in a situation in which we simply cannot recognize our sins and repent for them.

Like in the context of yisurin shel ahavah, Ramban assumes that the tzadik v’ra lo is experiencing his afflictions due to some transgressions which need atonement. Ramban is consistent in his general assumption that suffering is correlated with sin.

Tzadik Ben Rasha

Ramban subsequently suggests that in some instances the tzadik may suffer because of his ancestry. This comment is challenging since the Gemara proposed and rejected it in favor of the previously mentioned answer of tzadik she’eino gamur.^[4]R. Sperka (n185) notes this difficulty and offers a lengthy resolution which is beyond the scope of this essay.

It is worth noting, however, that when Ramban offers his concise summary of his tzadik v’ra lo analysis, he omits this answer, focusing exclusively on tzadik she’eino gamur.

Ta’am Ne’elam

Ramban notes that the Gemara (Berachos 7a) comments that the aforementioned answers are incompatible with the opinion of Rebbe Meir.^[5]Shaar HaGemul, #77 Rebbe Meir assumes that God responded to Moshe in the negative, declaring that he will never grasp the depth of tzadik v’ra lo and rasha v’tov lo, rather they will remain eternally enigmatic.

Ramban comments, though, that Rebbe Meir does not entirely disregard the previous suggestions, rather he assumes that there will always remain some number of inexplicable cases.^[6]Shaar HaGemul, #81 Even Rebbe Meir agrees that tzadik she’eino gamur will account for many cases of tzadik v’ra lo, but he assumes that there are still instances which will be inscrutable and unanswerable; namely, there may be a case of a completely righteous person who still suffers afflictions. Ramban refers to this as a “ta’am ne’elam” – “a hidden reason.”

Sod Ha’ibur

Ramban’s final suggestion is the most esoteric and elusive, but perhaps the most all-encompassing as well. Ramban notes that in addition to the previous three explanations for tzadik v’ra lo, there are instances of inexplicable yisurin suffered by a tzadik gamur which are attributable not to his actions in this lifetime, nor to the actions of his ancestors, but rather to the actions of his soul in a previous lifetime.^[7]Shaar HaGemul, #85. Though it is somewhat vague, we are assuming that this final suggestion – sod ha’ibur – is separate and distinct from the previous one – ta’am ne’elam. It may be that … Continue reading

Ramban refers the reader to the concept of “sod ha’ibur,” colloquially referred to as “gilgul neshamah,” wherein the soul transmigrates and inhabits different bodies throughout history.^[8]Ramban initially notes and subsequently expands on how this explanation is contained within the cryptic soliloquy of Elihu in Sefer Iyov. A fuller treatment of this complex analysis is beyond the … Continue reading Since one’s neshamah may be the reincarnation of a now deceased individual’s neshamah, it is always possible that one’s suffering is not due to his sins during his current lifetime, but rather retribution for the transgressions committed by his soul in a previous lifetime.

This answer is especially necessary for the tragic cases of the suffering and untimely deaths of babies, young children, or pure tzadikim.^[9]Ramban comments that this reason accounts for the still more common case of rasha v’tov lo, as well. Though rare, Ramban notes that we do witness such events occurring.^[10]Shaar HaGemul, #131 It is impossible to argue that an infant is being punished for his transgressions.^[11]See Michtav Me’Eliyahu Vol. 2, p. 225 The only humanly fathomable reason – should one exist – must be the concept of sod ha’ibur.

Ramban is noticeably secretive about the sod ha’ibur, unwilling to divulge its truths and explain the matter publicly.^[12]It is worth noting that later authorities – among them, successors to the Ramban’s school of thought and learning – were more open about discussions of gilgul neshamah. These thinkers include, … Continue reading More than once, he claims that only one who has a clear, authoritative tradition on the concept should study it intimately. It very well may be that Ramban felt this was a part of sisrei Torah – the secrets of an esoteric Kabbalistic tradition which are not meant to be engaged in by the masses. He is thusly discouraging pursuit of a topic beyond the reach of popular readership.

R. Netanel Wiederblank suggests another reasonable explanation for Ramban’s concealment.^[13]This is found in R. Wiederblank’s hitherto unpublished third volume of “Illuminating Jewish Thought.” One natural byproduct of knowing the sod ha’ibur is that a person might jump to absolve himself of guilt. If one’s afflictions might be attributable not to their own actions but to the actions of some now deceased previous version of their soul, there is little to no accountability nor demand for repentance on the sufferer’s part. Ramban is secretive and terse in discussing this explanation, because he is telegraphing that it is a last resort answer, in the quite rare instance in which a person has absolutely no sins whatsoever. Hiding the truth of this secret encourages the individual to focus on introspection and not blame his troubles on others.

IV. A POINTLESS PURSUIT?

Why Ask Why?

The pursuit of a metaphysic of suffering – grappling with theodicy – is a unique area of study due to the inherent impossibility of the task. As R. Yanai stated unequivocally in Maseches Avos (4:15), we can never know why the wicked experience tranquility nor why the righteous suffer. Even so, a list of Jewish thinkers too long to enumerate did indeed engage with the question. Knowing full well that the mystery was insoluble, the great philosophical minds struggled mightily with the question.

This is a curious phenomenon. Why engage with a problem which has no resolution? For what purpose should one trek through an obviously endless intellectual maze? What does one stand to gain from searching for the bedrock of a bottomless pit? Ramban notes that there were those who leveled this criticism and argued that it was more sensible to disengage with the study of theodicy.

ואם תשאל עלינו כיון שיש ענין נעלם במשפט, ונצטרך להאמין בצדקו מצד שופט האמת יתברך ויתעלה, למה תטריח אותנו ותצוה עלינו ללמוד הטענות שפירשנו והסוד שרמזנו, ולא נשליך הכל על הסמך שנעשה בסוף שאין לפניו לא עולה ולא שכחה אלא שכל דבריו במשפט…

And if you will ask on us, since this matter is beyond comprehension within [the system of] justice, and we will perforce [resort] to believing in His righteousness as the True Judge, may He be blessed and exalted; why should you bother us and demand that we study the queries which we have explained and the secrets to which we have alluded? [Why] shouldn’t we [simply] rely completely on the final assumption that there is no perversion [emanating] from Him, nor is there forgetfulness, rather, all His ways are just…^[14]Shaar HaGemul, #124

Though we will return to Ramban’s answer to this question, let us first divert our attention to Rambam, in an attempt to glean a perspective on the purpose of studying theodicy.

Rambam’s Approach: Enhancing God’s Love for Man

In his brief analysis of the aforementioned verses detailing Moshe’s request for knowledge of His ways and God’s response, Rambam offers deep insight into the nature of the request and the purpose thereof.

דע כי אדון החכמים, משה רבנו ע”ה, ביקש שתי בקשות ובאה לו תשובה על שתי הבקשות. הבקשה האחת היא שביקש ממנו יתעלה שיודיענו את עצמותו ואת אמיתת מהותו. הבקשה השנייה – והיא זו אשר ביקשה ראשונה – היא שיודיענו תאריו. וענה לו יתעלה בכך שהבטיח להודיעו את תאריו כולם ושהם מעשיו. כן הודיעו, כי אין להשיג את עצמותו כפי שהיא… בקשתו לדעת את תאריו, היא מה שאמר: הודיעני נא את דרכיך ואדעך למען אמצא חן בעיניך… הודיעני נא כו’ ואדעך הוא ראיה לכך שהא-ל יתעלה נודע בתאריו, כי כאשר ידע את הדרכים ידע אותו

Following an impressive, convincing display of his parshanus capabilities in which Rambam distinguishes between two requests that Moshe made – knowledge of God Himself (kavod) and knowledge of His ways/attributes (derech), Rambam sheds light on the purpose of the pursuit of the Question of Questions, weaving it beautifully into the words of the verses themselves.

דבריו: למען אמצא חן בעיניך הם ראיה לכך שמי שיודע את הא-ל הוא אשר ימצא חן בעיניו, לא מי שצם ומתפלל בלבד. יתר על כן, כל היודע אותו הוא הרצוי והמקורב, וכל שאינו יודע אותו הוא השנוא והמורחק. לפי מידת הידיעה ואי-הידיעה יהיו שביעות הרצון והשנאה, הקרבה והריחוק…

His (i.e. – Moshe’s) words: “So that I will find favor in Your eyes” are proof that the one who knows the Lord is the one who finds favor in His eyes, as opposed to one who only fasts and prays. Moreover, one who knows Him is desired [by Him] and close [to Him]; and one who does not know Him is disdained [by Him] and distanced [from Him]. In accordance with the level of knowledge or ignorance will be the desirability or the disdain, the closeness or the distance.^[15]Moreh Nevuchim 1:54. It is fascinating to note how this closing line mirrors Rambam’s famous formulation in Hilchos Teshuvah 10:6: אינו אוהב הקדוש ברוך הוא אלא בדעת … Continue reading

According to Rambam, the pesukim are telegraphing the motivation for Moshe’s inquiry. “Please, show me Your ways, grant me deeper understanding of Your attributes, so that I may find favor in Your eyes.” Apparently, one who “knows” God finds more favor in His eyes than someone who is ignorant as to His actions. God’s love for man increases proportionately with the increase of man’s knowledge of Him.

And so, it seems, one should be motivated to understand God’s ways out of a desire to be beloved by Him. Though it is impossible to obtain complete knowledge as pertains to the question of tzadik v’ra lo, the more one understands, the more beloved he is before God, making the pursuit a worthy one.^[16]Rambam (Moreh Nevuchim, ibid.) continues to offer yet another motivation to understand darkei Hashem. מפני שאלה הם המעשים היוצאים מלפניו יתעלה באשר להבאת … Continue reading

Ramban’s Approach: Partial Knowledge Empowers

Ramban assumes the need to plumb the depths of theodicy to be evident.^[17]Ramban argues that the study of theodicy is “chovas kol nivra” – “the obligation of every [human] creature.” Of course, intellectual capacity varies, thus the nature and extent of the level … Continue reading Of course, we can’t know everything, but one who searches and toils to understand will ultimately become a greater believer. Ramban’s explanation is somewhat cryptic:

נהיה מאמינים ובוטחים באמונתנו בנודע ובנעלם יותר מזולתנו, כי נלמוד סתום מן המפורש לידע יושר הדין וצדק המשפט…

Ramban argues that in the pursuit of ultimate knowledge we are bound to come up short, but we will benefit with the capability to “learn the inscrutable from the explicit.” R. Yoel Sperka understands Ramban’s intent to be that if we study the topic intensely, we will solve many problems. Though we will inevitably fall short of the goal of complete understanding, as certain topics are simply impenetrable, we will be more confident in our strength of belief due to the amount of knowledge we have gained.^[18]Shaar HaGemul, Chazon Yoel edition, p. 222 Namely, the more we know, the stronger we will be in the face of the unknown. Our limited knowledge protects us from wavering when confronting the unknowable.^[19]Alternatively, perhaps Ramban means that our obtained knowledge will necessarily shed light on even the more enigmatic situations for which we can achieve no answers. True, the topics will always be … Continue reading

V. OF KNOWLEDGE AND PRAYER

Ramban notes that if we assume that there are situations in which the reason for suffering is entirely inscrutable, it is quite understandable that prophets throughout the generation asked “why.” As explained, the “why” question on the part of the prophets was purely an intellectual pursuit, asked on the plane of thematic Halakhah and philosophy, not about any particular case of tzadik v’ra lo. Given their lack of understanding, they petitioned God to explain the concept of evil to them.

However, if we understand the Gemara to have offered answers to the query, and we accept the explanation of sod ha’ibur, one wonders why prophets the likes of Yirmiyahu, Chabakuk, and David would ask “why.” Do they not already know the answers?

Ramban addresses this question.^[20]Shaar HaGemul, #78 Though the prophets were fully aware that some minimal transgressions or sins of a past life account for tzadik v’ra lo, this knowledge did not preclude prayer. Their petitioning was not for an answer, but “rather, simply like the words of an ailing individual [who is] languishing in his illness, expressing the enormity of his sickness, and screaming about the distress and pain, wondering how this [pain] could happen to him.”^[21]Ibid. The question is rhetorical. The prophets feel the pain of the tzadik v’ra lo and cry out viscerally, petitioning God on their behalf, searching for resolution and healing. They call out to God not inquisitively, but prayerfully.

This explanation bears an important perspective. R. Soloveitchik eloquently distinguished between two levels of interaction with the question of tzadik v’ra lo: the practical and the theoretical. The theoretical plane is one of philosophy. On this level, one can and should ask “why.” However, the practical plane demands seeking a solution, asking “for what,” and repurposing the suffering for spiritual growth. Prayer, too, belongs to this practical realm. Just as self-improvement and hilchos aveilus are pragmatic responses demanded by halacha; so too, prayer. The correct, appropriate, encouraged response of one who suffers or one who witnesses suffering is to call out to God in prayer, petitioning Him and beseeching Him to display His ultimate benevolence.

Even as the Jewish thinker crafts theological answers to “why,” defending God’s benevolence and explaining away evil as a non-entity, the same Jew simultaneously prays to his Maker, begging for mercy. Prayer is a human experience. Wholehearted belief in the benevolence of God and the absolute truth that everything God does is for the better does not in any way preclude passionate, desperate prayer.^[22]This is an important perspective to keep in mind when considering the question of R. Yosef Albo and others: how may one pray for healing if God divinely ordained that we experience sickness? Many an … Continue reading

APPENDIX

R. Soloveitchik’s Distinction Between “Thematic Halakhah” and “Topical Halakhah”

R. Soloveitchik himself explicated and elaborated upon this sharp, nuanced distinction, encouraging both the philosophical pursuit and the practical response, each in their right place. He notes that any attempt to “explore therapeutic and redemptive qualities of the religious act” must be preceded by an initial examination of “the philosophy of suffering.”^[23]R. Soloveitchik, Out of the Whirlwind (ed. Shatz, Wolowelsky, Ziegler), p. 91

Therefore, prior to exploring the remedial redemptive potential of our Judaic religious act, we must spell out in articulate, precise terms the Judaic doctrine of suffering and define clearly our attitude vis-à-vis an unfriendly world replete with disorder and disharmony… The practical and functional motifs are undergirded by the theoretical ones…^[24]Ibid.

Hence, our immediate attention must be focused upon halakhic theodicy… As an equivalent for theodicy, we must focus on the halakhic metaphysic of evil or suffering…^[25]Ibid., p. 92

R. Soloveitchik continues to distinguish between two frames of reference with which the Halakhah always operates: the topical Halakhah and the thematic Halakhah.

[W]e would say that the topical frame of reference of the positive Halakhah is confined to the world of whose existence we are assured by our sense experience and which is bounded by time and space. The topical frame of reference is this physical universe… the universe of becoming and disappearing, of life and death. By contrast, the frame of reference of the thematic Halakhah, of halakhic axiology, of the halakhic universe of values, is not limited merely to this world, but envelops Being in its majestic totality as a whole… The frame of reference of the thematic Halakhah is not only a this-worldly one, but is transcendental as well.

The topical Halakhah or halakhic gesture thus fashions its interpretive axiological methods in the mold of finiteness and sensibility. It displays extreme modesty and sobriety in its approach to Being. The thematic gesture, however, is by far more bold and possessed by the spirit of adventure. It exceeds the boundaries of our own ontological awareness, which is imprisoned within a scientifically explainable universe, and attempts to relate itself to parts unknown, to link up the orders of things and events with the transcendental order of the ultimate. The thematic Halakhah opened up the closed frame of topical reference and accommodated infinity itself.

Judaism, then, operates with two frames of reference because Judaism is engaged in the dialectical method, in an antithetical approach to reality. One frame of reference is one sector of being, the this-worldly sector, and a second frame of reference is Being in its majestic totality.^[26]Ibid., p. 93

After distinguishing between “thematic Halakhah” which addresses themes and motifs beyond the physical world of practicality and “topical Halakhah” which is “anthropo-oriented” and pragmatic, R. Soloveitchik notes that each of these systems of Halakhah has its own unique approach to the problem of evil.

It is very certain that the thematic Halakhah – the Halakhah related to the outside… something beyond – even though it was embarrassed to the point of perplexity by the existence of evil, managed to somehow accommodate it within its frame of reference. The best proof that the thematic Halakhah – thematic Judaism, axiological Judaism – was embarrassed and even tormented, was confused and bewildered by evil or by Satan, is the Book of Job.

Within the thematic Halakhah, we find theodicy or, to be more precise, a metaphysic of suffering. Judaism, at the level of axiology or at the level of transcendental reference, did develop a metaphysic of evil, or, I would rather say, of suffering…^[27]Ibid. p. 95

In this context, R. Soloveitchik notes that the thematic Halakhah’s metaphysic of suffering embraced Rambam’s negation of evil, whereas topical Halakhah rejects such denial and engages a reality of evil head on.

The dominant idea which underlies this metaphysic of evil developed by the thematic Halakhah is basically that suffering as a subjective experience – an emotion, an affect, a feeling – and evil as a reality are not identical. The fact that people in distress… ascribe their misery to some outside agency called “evil” or “Satan”… and identify their subjective experiences with a destructive fiend or enemy of man, does not prove that evil actually exists and that it reveals itself through the pathetic mood or the passional mood. On the contrary, the thematic Halakhah’s metaphysic maintained that the passional experience represents the highest good.^[28]Ibid. p. 96

The topical Halakhah could not accept the thematic metaphysic which tends to gloss over the absurdity of evil… Realism and individualism, ineradicably ingrained in the very essence of the topical Halakhah, prevented it from casting off the burden of the awareness of evil.^[29]Ibid. p. 100

The topical Halakhah, which is particularly interested in real man… could not be content with a fine metaphysical distinction between evil and the pathos of being… The topical Halakhah lacked neither the candor nor the courage to admit publicly that evil does exist, and it pleaded ignorance as to its justification and necessity.^[30]Ibid. p. 101

After clearly delineating the roles and goals of these two aspects of the Halakhah, R. Soloveitchik emphasizes the importance of practical response in the approach of topical Halakhah.

Yes, the topical Halakhah has evolved an ethic of suffering instead of a metaphysic of suffering. While the metaphysic is out to discover the ontological objective reason of suffering from within, the ethic posits meanings from within and without. It is concerned not so much with pathos as such but with the pathetic mood of the person in distress, with the assimilation of pain into the total I-awareness, with man’s response to adversity and disaster… The metaphysic seeks to justify evil or deny its reality. The ethic of suffering seeks the transformation of an alien factum which one encounters into an actus in which one engages, the succumbing to an overwhelming force into an experience impregnated with directedness and sense.^[31]Ibid. p. 102

Thematic Halakhah rightfully engages in theodicy. Topical Halakhah adheres strictly to the practical response to the suffering. In this context, R. Soloveitchik is lucid in his formulation: a philosophically inclined metaphysic is not inherently wrong, it is just often misapplied. Thematic Halakhah indeed toiled to justify or nullify the existence of evil in this world, although without complete success.

However, God’s criticism of Iyov is due not to the wrongful nature of such a metaphysic, but rather to the gross misapplication thereof. When operating within the human experience, when real man encounters real evil – one must apply the topical Halakhah, a construct and theory which provides practical answers in the form of active responses to suffering.

It is through this lens of topical Halakhah which R. Soloveitchik is looking when he observes the futility and inappropriateness of the “why” question in Kol Dodi Dofek. Theodicy has its time and place, but it belongs not in the realm of the passional, human experience of a realistic evil.