Saving the Life of a Gentile on Shabbat: A Case Study in Revisionism and Rav Aharon Lichtenstein

by R. Shlomo Zuckier

In the years following the passing of a great Torah figure, it’s not uncommon to see a shift in how their views are represented, or repurposed. Once a towering scholar no longer speaks for themselves, students, communities, and critics may read their own agendas into their legacy. A Gadol seen as a consensus figure becomes the object of debate, reinterpreted to suit the needs and assumptions of a later generation.

This tendency is especially prominent with figures whose thought is dialectical or multifaceted. The legacy of the Rav (Rav Joseph B. Soloveitchik) provides perhaps the most striking example. (See the now-classical article, “Revisionism and the Rav,” by Lawrence Kaplan, in Judaism 48:3 (1999): 290-311.) He often offered divergent advice to different Talmidim, and his dialectical thought offered unresolved tensions rather than synthetic harmonies. It’s only natural that interpreters, well-intentioned or otherwise, would focus on one particular strand or another and treat it as exhaustive of the Rav’s thought, on both the left and the right.

With Rav Aharon Lichtenstein (1933-2015), also a Gadol even if less colossal than his father-in-law, one might have thought that we could avoid this challenge. Rav Aharon was a Rosh Yeshiva at Yeshivat Har Etzion and one of the leading exponents of Modern Orthodoxy in the late 20th and early 21st centuries. He was renowned for his synthesis of deep Talmudic scholarship, broad literacy in the Western canon, ethical sensitivity, and spiritual humility. Rav Aharon’s writings and teachings are marked less by dialectic than by a drive for synthesis. He avoids contradictions not by eliding complexity but by directly engaging tensions and working them through to principled resolution. Over the decades, in so many areas of his Lomdus, Hashkafa, and general approach, Rav Aharon remained remarkably consistent in both tone and substance.

Yet even that was apparently insufficient to prevent revisionism. Rav Aharon’s stature, moderation, and intellectual refinement make him a tempting mirror in which people see what they want to see. By some, he is cast more as a projection of a progressive Orthodox hero, by others as a champion of unyielding fidelity, rather than as an actual Gadol who held particular views that we know – views that were often more moderate than these extremes, and that sometimes staked out more “liberal” and other times more “conservative” approaches, even as Rav Aharon clearly integrated both an open approach and traditionalist reflexes.

This essay considers a case study where Rav Lichtenstein’s views have been distorted or oversimplified, both in his lifetime and posthumously. This case, of violating Shabbos in order to save a non-Jewish life, fits squarely within the challenge of balancing Halacha and ethics in general, introducing a particular, high-stakes scenario.

Rav Aharon Lichtenstein on the Relation between Ethics and Halacha

A useful entry point into Rav Lichtenstein’s thought on ethics and Halacha in general is his landmark essay “Does Jewish Tradition Recognize an Ethic Independent of Halakha?,” originally published in Modern Jewish Ethics, ed. Marvin Fox (Ohio State University Press, 1975), pp. 62–88. There, he stakes out a position against the claim that Halacha exhausts the domain of the good. Rav Lichtenstein insists that Judaism acknowledges ethical imperatives beyond the bounds of codified law, citing Aggadic sources and the notion of lifnim mishuras hadin as exemplars. However, he is equally clear that this ethic only supplements Halacha and never overrides it:

[A]t most, we can only speak of a complement to Halakha, not of an alternative. Any ethic so independent of Halakha so as to obviate or override it, clearly lies beyond our pale. There are of course situations in which ethical factors… sanction the breach… of specific norms. However, these factors are themselves halakhic considerations, in the most technical sense of the term, and their deployment entails no rejection of the system whatsoever. (“Ethic Independent,” p. 67)

Halacha retains its primacy, and no external moral sentiment can override a binding Halachic ruling, although Halacha itself includes certain ethical factors that at times override the usual Halacha in extreme cases. Still, the question remains what to do in cases of a conflict between Halacha and ethics, a question that is largely avoided in that seminal article.

Rav Lichtenstein does deal with cases of clashes between ethics and Halacha elsewhere. In “The Source of Faith is Faith Itself” (re-published in Tradition 47:4 (Winter 2014), pp. 188-91), he acknowledges having had a crisis of faith surrounding issues of ethics and Halacha in his youth:

At one point, during my late teens, I was troubled by certain ethical questions concerning Amalek, ir ha-nidahat, etc. I then recalled having recently read that Rav Chaim Brisker would awaken nightly to see if someone hadn’t placed a foundling at his doorstep. I knew that I slept quite soundly, and I concluded that if such a paragon of hesed coped with these halakhot, evidently the source of my anxiety did not lie in my greater sensitivity but in my weaker faith. And I set myself to enhancing it. (p. 190)

Rav Lichtenstein’s resolution was not to solve the moral-Halachic contradiction but to strengthen his faith. Not to dull his ethical concerns, and certainly not to undermine his Halachic commitments, but to realize that he didn’t necessarily have all the answers. Epistemic humility, coupled with reliance on his great religious and ethical forbears, was in order.

Another good illustration of Rav Lichtenstein’s emphasis on epistemic humility emerges from an interview with R. Chaim Sabato in the book Mevakshei Panecha (Jerusalem: Yediot Aharonot, 2011; English version published as Seeking His Presence with Koren, 2016). Rav Lichtenstein clearly states that it is unequivocally wrong to own slaves on ethical grounds and simultaneously is unwilling to criticize pre-modern Jews who may have held slaves or the Halachic categories that allow for it.

Frequently, then, in cases of apparent conflict between ethics and Halacha, Rav Lichtenstein resorts to humility, the ability to admit one’s inability to solve a problem, without challenging Halacha or rejecting ethical values. However, he also leaves open a different approach, that of interpretation. As he writes in his primary Hebrew-language article on the topic, “Halakha ve-Halakhim ke-Oshiyot Musar” (published in Arachin be-Mivchan Milchamah, Jerusalem 1985, pp. 13-24), a duly authorized Posek may at times interpret texts in attempting to resolve this sort of conflict, offering an analogue to the case of the Akedah:

Indeed, a Jew is obligated to respond, “Here I am,” when confronted with the command, “Offer him there as a burnt offering” (Genesis 22:2). Yet, before unsheathing the knife, one is both permitted and required, to the best of his ability, to ascertain whether this is truly the command he has been given: Is the message unequivocal? Is the ethical conflict so stark and direct? If there is room for interpretation – and this must be thoroughly investigated – a sensitive and discerning conscience becomes one of the factors shaping proper discretion . . . (pp. 20-21)

Of course, he goes on to clearly state that this sort of interpretation must be carried out within the Halachic system, which remains authoritative in all cases. Great caution must be taken, and only a great Posek should suggest such novel interpretations. Thus, throughout all relevant articles on Halacha and morality, Rav Lichtenstein consistently avers that any conflict between Halacha and ethics must either be avoided, or, if the conflict ultimately persists, be resolved in favor of Halacha.

This is not a glib assertion that “the Torah is moral.” Rav Aharon’s approach is more textured: he accepts the theoretical possibility of moral discomfort with Halachic norms, yet holds that humility and sophisticated interpretation can often alleviate such tension. Where conflict remains, Halacha overrides, but only after the interpreter has exhausted interpretive pathways, evaluated the nature of the obligation, and reaffirmed the basic premise that God, as Commander, binds us to His law. (For those interested in a fuller account of Rav Lichtenstein’s views on these issues, see my essay in the most recent Tradition issue, “Recognizing Rav Aharon Lichtenstein’s Contribution to Ethics and Halakha” (Tradition 57:2, pp. 25-63).

Saving a Non-Jew on Shabbos

Possibly the most striking and morally fraught example of tension between Halacha and ethics is the apparent prohibition against violating Shabbos to save the life of a non-Jew. The Mishnah (Yoma 8:7) makes a distinction between saving a Jew and a non-Jew, which is often understood to mean that, at least in principle, one is not permitted to desecrate Shabbos to save a non-Jew. This seems morally challenging on its face – I have seen children raise a moral objection upon encountering the Mishnah.

Later Halachic authorities attempt to mitigate this ruling. In a sugya running from Avodah Zarah 26a to Orach Chayim 330 and through various responsa (e.g., Igros Moshe, O.C. 4:79), multiple authorities argue that, in practice, one may and must save the life of a non-Jew, due to eivah, the concern that failure to do so would endanger Jewish lives through political or social backlash. While this resolves the practical issue, it seemingly reinforces the principle that non-Jewish lives are of lesser Halachic value, protected only instrumentally, to avoid harm to Jews.

This formulation has prompted considerable discomfort. Some modern interpreters have sought to reinterpret eivah (and similarly with darkei shalom) as an intrinsic moral category, asserting that the Halacha recognizes all human life as equally sacred. But these readings are difficult to sustain textually and contextually, failing to account for the language and logic of the Halachic sources.

An alternative path, taken by Rav Ahron Soloveichik among others, argues that the rules regarding gentiles in the time of the Talmud do not apply to gentiles today, because they qualify as a ger toshav, a resident alien, and Ramban (Shichechei Asin, 15) and others assert that there is a mitzvah to save such gerei toshav, even on Shabbos. (See his article “בענין מבקרין חולי עכו”ם מפני דרכי שלום” in his Sefer עוד ישראל יוסף בני חי (Chicago: Yeshivas Brisk, 1993).) However, this is not the most prevalent explanation of the relevant Halacha, and Rav Lichtenstein does not develop this idea in writing anywhere.

Rav Aharon Lichtenstein on Saving a Non-Jew on Shabbos

Instead, in his article “‘Mah Enosh’: Reflections on the Relation between Judaism and Humanism” (TUMJ 14 (2006), pp. 1-61), Rav Lichtenstein offers a remarkably original, yet textually grounded, interpretation that reconfigures how the Halachic framework itself is to be understood. Drawing on a different position attributed to the Ramban (at Toras ha-Adam, sha’ar ha-sakkanah), Rav Aharon argues that we do not desecrate Shabbos to save a Jewish life because a Jew’s life is more valuable than Shabbos. Rather, we do so to preserve future Shabbos observance: cḥalel alav Shabbos acḥas kedei she-yishmor Shabbosos harbeh (see Yoma 86b). We desecrate Shabbos to save a Jew’s life not because that life outweighs Shabbos but because it enables the fulfillment of Shabbos in the future.

From this standpoint, the prohibition to desecrate Shabbos for a non-Jew’s life is not because their life is worth less than that of a Jew. In truth, all lives are valued equally in principle, and for all areas of Halacha they equally override even biblical prohibitions. Performing melacha on Shabbos, because it is among the most stringent prohibitions (what we might call the arba chamuros), is not overridden by saving a life. Violating Shabbos can only be overridden by a later fulfillment of Shabbos, hence the rule of challel Shabbos achas… Since that is only relevant for Jews, only Jews are saved on Shabbos, in principle.

Two things should be clear about Rav Aharon’s approach to anyone familiar with this sugya: First, it is a radically creative approach that is brought to bear in interpreting the sources to equate in principle the value of a Jewish and non-Jewish life, a deeply humanist position. Second, it does not solve in practice the morally challenging aspects of this Halacha and therefore one would need to rely on an alternate approach to justify violation of Shabbos in order to save a non-Jew, in practice.

This approach follows Rav Lichtenstein’s broader methodology in the relation between Halacha and ethics. He refuses to dismiss Halacha, distort the sources, or elevate moral instinct above law. But he also refuses, on ethical grounds, to accept an interpretation that would degrade non-Jewish life. Instead, with wide-ranging creativity, Rav Lichtenstein offers a principled, source-based resolution that maintains fidelity to Halacha and affirms moral equality.

Urban Legends and Revisionism Regarding Rav Lichtenstein on Saving Gentiles on Shabbos

Despite its conceptual elegance and moral force, this interpretation has not received wide attention, and it largely remains obscure in the broader discourse on this issue. One reason may be that Rav Lichtenstein’s approach does not lend itself to soundbites. It is Halachically subtle and morally serious, but not catchy. In an age of algorithmic outrage and viral quotes, complexity can be a liability.

Instead, we see various distorted versions of Rav Aharon’s view on saving gentiles on Shabbos gaining traction. Perhaps the most pervasive is an urban legend cited in R. Mayer Lichtenstein’s recent book (Musar Avi, self-published, 2025, p. 192), presented as a question posed to Rav Aharon at an Orthodox Forum over two decades ago:

I heard that you said that you would save the non-Jew, violating Shabbos, and then bring a chattas offering for having violated Shabbos. Is this true?

This version suggests that Rav Aharon sanctioned violating Halacha to follow his moral conscience, accepting the sin and its punishment in form of a sin-offering in the (future) Temple.

But this understanding is deeply flawed. First, if one believes something to be the proper course of action, that would presumably either be mezid or not a sin at all, but presumably not qualify as the shogeg sin required for incurring a chattas? (If you know what you are doing is omer muttar, it is presumably no longer omer muttar.) More importantly, the idea that the “correct” path involves knowingly violating Halacha is foreign to Rav Lichtenstein’s entire worldview. As we saw above, Halacha is binding and absolute, and in a conflict between moral intuition and Halachic obligation, Halacha wins. Rav Lichtenstein writes in many places about how he relates to Hakadosh Baruch Hu primarily as “the Commander” (see, e.g., “Mah Enosh,” p. 24), a Being whose directives, once clear, cannot be challenged or sidestepped.

[Parenthetically, this urban legend is a close relative of another urban legend regarding Rav Lichtenstein’s view on what he would do if stuck on a desert island with only pork and human flesh. Rav Lichtenstein’s actual view was that he would eat the human flesh, a lesser prohibition than eating the pig, while some have propagated the idea that he would consume the pork but then do teshuvah for it. A similar problem applies to this view, which Rav Lichtenstein himself never endorsed.]

So what is the real story? In the same volume, R. Mayer cites Rav Aharon’s response to this query (Musar Avi, p. 192):

אומנם כן, הייתי מציל את הגוי אף אם זה היה כרוך בחילול השבת. הייתי מרים את עיניי למרום ואומר לקב”ה, חיללתי שבת להציל גוי כי אני חושב שזה רצונך: כך פסק מו”ר הרב אהרן סולובייצ’יק

It is indeed true, I would save the gentile, even if it would be tied up with desecration of Shabbos. I would raise my eyes to Heaven and say to God ‘I desecrated Shabbos in order to save a gentile because I believe this is Your will’; so ruled my teacher and master Rav Ahron Soloveichik.”

Stated as a corrective against the perspective that he should sin and bring a hattat, Rav Lichtenstein clarifies that his approach in saving the non-Jew is not a defiance of Halacha but rather a fulfillment of it, based on the view of Rav Ahron Soloveichik noted above. As R. Mayer notes, Rav Aharon would not have acted without a Halachic basis. He was not violating Halacha to serve morality. He was relying on a Halachic ruling that such an act is permissible, and even obligatory, within the Halachic system. This is a ruling, R. Mayer notes further, that Rav Soloveichik gave to doctors to apply in practice. It may be that Rav Lichtenstein did not find Rav Ahron Soloveichik’s view to be the majority, authoritative view (although it is certainly also possible that he did); in a theoretical vacuum with no relevant ethical issues, he might not have adopted it. However, given the ethical stakes at hand – saving a human life! – there was good reason to follow Rav Ahron Soloveichik’s position. Rav Lichtenstein has argued that in a situation of a clash between the prima facie Halacha and a clear humanist ethical principle, such as this case, he was willing to rely on a minority view, bish’as ha-dechak. (See “Mah Enosh” and “The Human and Social Factor in Halakha,” Tradition 36:1, pp. 1-25, on reliance on minority positions, which he also applied in practice.)

However, this subtlety is often lost, and even this corrective offered by Rav Aharon Lichtenstein in this story has been misinterpreted by those seeking to derive more simplistic or shocking views from Rav Aharon’s ethically based approach.

Recently, some have put forward a novel interpretation of the passage in Rav Mayer’s Musar Avi. Ignoring Rav Aharon’s justification of his action by reference to R. Ahron Soloveichik’s view, and instead emphasizing the words “חיללתי שבת,” they instead read Rav Lichtenstein’s statement as a theological protest: I will do what I believe is right, even against Halacha , and justify myself to God. This highly implausible reading is described as “so incredibly radical, almost Iszbitz’esque,” dubiously asserting a linkage to those antinomian ideas, and offered as evidence that Rav Lichtenstein, troubled by the clash between Halacha and ethics, must have secretly adopted this antinomian Hasidic approach, against all his other writings on this topic.

This interpretation is as fallacious as it is fanciful. Its problems are numerous, and will be delineated below (even such an exercise should not be necessary). First, this approach takes the fact that Rav Aharon said the words חיללתי שבת to mean that he broke Halacha in antinomian fashion, ignoring the fact that the phrase מחללין את השבת is routinely used in rabbinic literature to do an act that is generally prohibited but here permitted (see, e.g., Mishnah Rosh Hashana 1:4). Or, as Rav Aharon himself put it in the related context of avera lishmah, “the term avera refers, then, to an act which is proscribed under ordinary circumstances.” Of course, he is very clear that “the currently popular [in 1975] notion of avera lishmah (idealistic transgression) has no halakhic standing whatsoever.” (For citations above, see “Ethic Independent,” p. 84 n. 25 and p. 67.)

Moreover, as laid out above, Rav Lichtenstein explicitly and consistently rejected any approach that elevates moral intuition over Halacha. His essays on submission to God’s will, on autonomy and heteronomy, and on the centrality of command all point to the same conclusion. He does not break Halacha for ethics. He does attempt to interpret Halacha, using its internal tools, in a way that preserves ethical integrity; if that fails, he submits to the divine will, out of a stance of humility. And, of course, this dubious interpretation ignores the fact that Rav Lichtenstein, immediately after saying he would violate Shabbos, says he would do so in following the view of his Rebbe, Rav Ahron Soloveichik! It is hard to see how ignoring that clear statement is anything but willful illiteracy. And, of course, this reading ignores how the story is interpreted by Rav Mayer, Rav Aharon’s son and our source for the story in the first place.

We actually possess another account of Rav Aharon Lichtenstein’s views where he clarifies the connection between Rav Ahron Soloveichik’s view and his own view. Rav Dov Karoll, a loyal talmid of Rav Lichtenstein, wrote an article entitled “Laws of Medical Treatment on Shabbat” that appeared in Verapo Yerape: And You Shall Surely Heal (Ktav, 2009, pp. 211-30), which sets up two approaches to saving a life: that of eivah and one based on the inherent value of a gentile’s life, attributed among others to Rav Ahron Soloveichik:

Rav Lichtenstein said that were he to be confronted with a case of violating Shabbat to save the life of a gentile, he would act to save the life of the gentile on principle, relying on those views that allow for it in principle, not based on societal concerns alone. (pp. 218-19)

Despite all the confirmations as to Rav Lichtenstein’s true view and consistent perspective across his writings over six decades, this revisionism sadly persists. We live in a world where depth is easily mistaken for ambiguity and those who seize upon the most shocking interpretation are unfortunately rewarded and thus persist in their misinterpretations.

Revisionism and Rav Aharon Lichtenstein

While this example above focused on a progressive distortion of Rav Lichtenstein’s views, there is also revisionism from “the right.” We might note Rav Lichtenstein’s general view on ethics and Halacha, which some dubiously have interpreted as rejecting moral intuitions as binding absent a clear Halachic source stating them. Or there is his nuanced view on organ donation, which has occasionally been presented for its technical Halachic content while minimizing his commitment to ethical issues.

For a real life example of revisionism I saw with my own eyes, I was once present when someone introduced Rav Lichtenstein by noting that he is a great champion of Torah Umadda, and kal va-chomer he would supports Torah UParnasa, only for Rav Lichtenstein to respond that, in his actual view, increasing one’s standard of living did not justify bittul Torah. We could multiply the examples, on both sides of the ledger. Rav Lichtenstein’s short article on “Women in Leadership” (Tradition 49:1 (2016), 31–35) might be a good example of a text interpreted by revisionists on both the right and the left. I may well develop further some of these other examples on a future opportunity.

Rav Lichtenstein’s Halachic, ethical, and intellectual integrity resists simplification in either ideological direction. Engaging his thought demands the hard work of interpretation, the humility of submission, and the courage of honest engagement. As the years pass since Rav Lichtenstein’s death, it becomes ever-more important to safeguard the richness of his legacy. That means resisting distortions, even well-meaning ones. It means reading his writings carefully, understanding his principles deeply, and quoting him fully, not selectively.

The greatest tribute we can offer is to take Rav Aharon Lichtenstein at full depth, to resist the urge to remake him in our image, and instead to let his commitment to Hashem, to Torah, to ethics, and to complexity continue to shape ours.