AI and Yeshiva Secular Education
by R. Gil Student
I. The Cost of Secular Education
The high cost of yeshiva tuition remains a significant challenge to many in the community. Artificial Intelligence (AI) promises a potential solution: it can reduce costs while simultaneously improving the education. Personalized instruction without the staff overhead make AI a potential game changer for yeshiva secular studies, provided it is designed properly.
For example, AI-based tools can provide personalized learning programs, giving each student their own content and learning pace. Where a human teacher may be responsible for dozens of students, AI can deliver individualized instruction simultaneously to all, with a teacher overseeing many classes as a supervisor and supplemental resource rather than as the primary educator. This technology would dramatically lower the need for staff, allowing schools to reduce payroll, the single largest driver of tuition costs.
It remains to be seen whether AI can serve effectively as a teacher. We must also ask whether halakhically we are allowed to use it in this function.
II. Teachers and Yeshiva Education
The Talmud (Avodah Zarah 15b) rules that one may not send a Jewish child to a gentile teacher. The reason for this prohibition is debated by commentators. Rambam (Mishneh Torah, Hilkhos Issurei Bi’ah 22:5) explains that the concern is primarily that gentile teachers in the ancient world were free to physically abuse Jewish students. If that danger is absent, Rambam implies, the prohibition does not apply. Rashi (ad loc., s.v. ve-ein mosrin lahem), however, presents a dual concern: not only the possibility of physical harm but also the spiritual danger that the teacher might influence the child to stray from traditional Jewish belief and practice. According to Rashi, the concern for indoctrination remains even if physical abuse is no longer an issue.
Rav Moshe Isserles (Rema; Yoreh De’ah 153:1) follows Rashi, which the Vilna Gaon (glosses, ad loc.) explains is because the concern about improper influence persists. Rav Shmuel of Furth, in his Beis Shmuel commentary on Shulchan Arukh (Even Ha-Ezer 22:7), argues that Rav Yosef Karo likewise follows Rashi. Thus, we find a critical disagreement: Rambam permits gentile teachers under conditions of safety, while Rashi maintains the prohibition due to the risk of ideological influence. Modern authorities follow Rashi’s strict view.
This seems to mean that yeshiva day schools should be forbidden to employ gentile teachers for secular subjects. And yet this is common practice. The explanation, I believe, lies in the difference between the ancient model and the modern school system. In Talmudic times, a child was sent to a teacher who functioned independently, teaching according to his own ideas. Such an arrangement raised both dangers outlined by Rambam and Rashi. Today, by contrast, secular teachers are employed within institutional frameworks. The yeshiva sets the curriculum, supervises instruction and enforces proper behavior. Teachers may not introduce ideological material outside of the approved syllabus.
I have found little discussion of this topic among the major halakhic authorities. The earliest I had found is Rav Akiva Schlesinger, in his 19th century polemic, Lev Ha-Ivri (vol. 1, p. 29n1). In his opposition to non-Orthodox Jews, Rav Schlesinger argues that those who are legally obligated to provide secular studies should hire gentile teachers rather than non-Orthodox Jews because the latter will be more likely to proselytize. In a footnote, he points out the Talmudic prohibition and argues that it only applies when a child goes to the teacher’s home or school to study. But when the teacher comes to the Jew’s home or to a Jewish school, it does not apply.
Rav Avraham David Horowitz (20th cen., Israel) reached an even more lenient conclusion. He argues that the prohibition only applies when there is a concern that a teacher will taint his class with his personal beliefs. However, if a secular school maintains standards and professionalism, a Jewish student may attend without concern (Kinyan Torah Ba-Halakhah, vol. 1, no. 55, par. 7). Of course, nowadays secular universities allow professors free reign to dilute their courses with their secular ideologies so no such permission remains.
Jewish day schools do not allow professors to inject their personal beliefs into the classroom. The Jewish studies faculty serves as role models and life guides while the secular studies faculty is there to teach the syllabus. This practice would halakhically justify the common practice of Jewish schools hiring gentile teachers for secular studies. However, those schools that, in the name of academic freedom, do not restrain their teachers would presumably fall under this prohibition.
III. AI as Secular Teachers
When applied to AI, this distinction becomes critical. According to Rambam’s view, an AI program cannot physically harm a child. The central concern—violence—does not exist. Therefore, Rambam’s framework would support permitting AI to serve as a secular studies instructor. According to Rashi’s approach, the concern of ideological influence remains. While AI has no beliefs of its own, its training data and algorithms may embed non-traditional or secular worldviews into its functioning. These could subtly shape a student’s thinking, precisely the concern Rashi articulated. On this basis, an unsupervised AI would be prohibited. Since the Rema codifies Rashi’s emphasis on ideological influence, the halakhic presumption is that AI instruction would be forbidden unless adequate safeguards are in place.
However, if supervision addresses the concerns with gentile teachers, it should likewise address the risks of AI. An AI system can be restricted through technical and educational “guardrails.” Programmers can filter its content, block religious or ideological commentary, and confine its role to secular subjects such as mathematics, science or language. It can even push it in the direction of traditional Jewish beliefs, forcing the AI to adopt an Orthodox viewpoint. In addition, rabbinic and educational supervisors can test the system’s outputs to ensure conformity with traditional Jewish standards. In fact, AI may present fewer risks than human teachers. While human instructors inevitably bring personal worldviews into the classroom, AI can be explicitly designed and constrained. It lacks independent agency. Thus, when properly programmed and supervised, AI arguably offers a safer and more controllable means of delivering secular education.
For yeshivos under pressure to contain tuition costs, this understanding opens a significant opportunity. If AI can be implemented with the necessary safeguards, not eliminating secular teachers but reducing the head count significantly, schools may deliver secular education more effectively at far lower cost. This could alleviate the crushing burden on families while preserving the high standards of Torah education. By investing in oversight and careful design, the community can reduce the financial burden while enhancing commitment to tradition.