Top Five: Right and Wrong Ways to Use Freewill
by R. Gidon Rothstein
Parshat Bereshit
For the past seven years (time flies!), we have been studying parsha together. Each year, I selected one or a few commentators to study, to see views of the weekly portion. As I start review and collation, to see what lessons the project as a whole teaches, this year, I’m going to select five comments that seem the cream of an often very good crop.
[I can’t resist: my teacher, R. Aharon Lichtenstein, z”l, more than once quoted Matthew Arnold’s essay “The Function of Criticism at the Present Time,” in which, in my memory, he argued that some ages are not so much creative as taking the creativity of a previous generation and distilling it, drilling down with it, to learn its lessons more fully. Let’s say we’re up to doing that here.]
I will select the five, present them much as I did originally, and check for commonalities. At the end of each week, I’ll also list the other comments we have studied in past years.
Nature’s Freewill
In Bereshit 1;11, Rashi says God commanded the Earth to grow trees whose bark tasted the same as the fruit. The Earth did not do so, says Rashi, evidenced by verse twelve’s speaking of its bringing forth “trees that made fruit,” not the tree itself being the fruit. Therefore, says Rashi, when Man was cursed for his sin, the Earth was also judged for its sin.
The first surprising idea is that the earth could contravene Hashem’s commands, or fulfill them badly. It implies some freewill, because otherwise how did it go awry? In addition, of course, punishment addresses those who could have done differently. Rashi does not elaborate, so we cannot know how far he would have taken this, but it gives a sense of the cosmos we moderns overconfidently reject.
The Right Time to Eat Fruit of the Tree of Knowledge
The Torah introduces the Tree of Knowledge in 2;9, and Chatam Sofer in Torat Moshe knows a Midrash (I didn’t find it) that assumes Adam and Chavah would have been allowed to eat from the Tree that first Shabbat. They were punished for eating it one day early, not for the fact of eating it.
Part of his logic is his certainty God would not create a Tree we are permanently not allowed to enjoy. To explain why Shabbat would have been the time, he accepts Ramban’s idea that the tree infused people with freewill as well as desire. Before, humans served God as a matter of instinct, desired only God’s service.
[This seems extreme, because the nachash convinced Chavah to eat; unless we say the nachash got her to believe that God wanted her to eat, that it was the proper service of Hashem. To me, it seems more likely there was always some freewill.]
Without desire or evil inclination, Chatam Sofer echoes what we just said, there is no place for reward or punishment. Freewill serves some people poorly, whose character tends to the physical and animalistic, increasing the likelihood of poor choices. On Shabbat, he says, the neshamah yeterah, the “extra” part to people’s souls gives them a greater ability to resist temptation [he assumes the non-Jewish Adam and Chavah would have a neshamah yeterah on Shabbat; I think he thinks that before the Fall, people were people, Shabbat was Shabbat, so everyone got one].
Had they first eaten of the Tree on Shabbat, the extra soul would have added a push to do well, shaping their freewill to always lean to the good. The nachash tricked them into partaking early, the Midrash said, teaching Chatam Sofer our troubles started with a premature exposure to desire and freewill. With us bearing the consequences forever.
Human Sexual Ethics Affects the Natural World
When God commands Adam to eat all the fruit of the Garden other than the Tree, 2;16-17, Meshech Hochmah reminds us of Sanhedrin 56b, where the Talmud finds a source or hint to all seven Noahide laws. Among those inferences, the Gemara reads the word lemor—Gd commanded lemor, a word we translate as “saying”—to indicate arayot, wrongful sexuality, including adultery.
To justify the connection, it cites Yirmiyahu 3;1, which starts with lemor and complains about the Jewish people’s marital infidelity (in the metaphor of the Jewish people as wife to Gd), verse two saying they had defiled the Land. Meshech Hochmah calls our attention to Sifra Kedoshim 3;7;3-4, which says their sins depressed the yield of the fruits, an idea R. Yehudah finds in Yirmiyahu itself.
To Meshech Hochmah, the lemor in Bereshit warned Adam to be careful about arayot so that he would be able to eat the fruit of the Garden (he also cites a Yerushalmi and Midrashim about how the crops went bad during the generation of the Flood). He singles out adultery (as did Yirmiyahu) because it is the form of sexual impropriety mentioned explicitly in this chapter in Bereshit, verse 24.
I think for Meshech Hochmah, the idea fits with his next comment, that Gd’s words achol tochel, you shall surely eat, commanded Adam to enjoy the natural world where permitted. Meshech Hochmah seems to view the original presentation of sexual ethics as much as information as a command: this is how the world works, I (God) want and expect you humans to enjoy the world, so stay away from arayot, especially adultery.
Meshech Hochmah inserts a metaphysical claim into a non-mystical context: how we behave in marriage (as societies, Sifra in Kedoshim said, not each individual) impacts crop yields.
Man’s Instinct to Recognize and Thank God
The Kayin and Hevel story starts with Kayin’s decision to offer a sacrifice to God, 4;3. Malbim thinks this shows an innate human tendency to know of, to want to thank God. To explain the flaws in his offering, reasons for God to reject it, Malbim spots four differences from Hevel’s that show broader issues with Kayin’s sense of God.
First, he made the offering miketz yamim, at the end of a period of time (the growing season, Malbim thinks), an indication he thought God was one of many factors helping nature along, only “needed” to be thanked once the harvest was done.
[Malbim knows the Torah established harvest gifts at the end of the growing season, too. I think he infers from the word miketz, at the end of, that Kayin deliberately waited for an end point, to show other factors had helped first, in contrast to his brother, as we are about to see. He reminds us of the Torah’s adamant opposition to worshipping God among other powers.]
Hevel brought mi-bechorot, from the first of his animals, a way to signify his belief God is the First Cause of everything, the reason later Jewish history also had people give firsts, of people, animals, and produce.
Three More Problems with Kayin’s Offering
Kayin also gave inferior produce, “of the fruits of the earth,” nothing special, where Hevel’s offering was mechelveihen, according to Onkelos mishamnehon, from the fattest of them. Malbim reads the verse to tell us Kayin thought God needed the offering in some sense, the reason he brought it la-Shem, to God, where Hevel knew better. Finally, the verse says Hevel hevi gam hu, brought he also, a phrasing Malbim thinks shows Hevel understood the essence of the sacrifice lies in the intention and experience of the one offering it.
Hevel offered himself and his submission, where Kayin brought only the physical produce, without any internal reaction or development to accompany the sacrifice.
His textual inferences show how Hevel’s sacrifice was better than Kayin’s, his knowing God is the First Cause of everything, knowing to give the best of what he had, for no need of God’s, to express his knowledge of and submission to God.
Regret Is Actually Giving Another Chance
In Bereshit 6;6, the Torah describes God as va-yinachem, usually thought of as regret. HaKetav VeHaKabbalah takes us in another direction, starting with Hoshe’a 11;8, the phrase yachad nichmeru nechumai, My rachamim, which I translate as willingness to give another chance, was aroused. When Yonah 3;8 says the people of Nineveh hoped God might be nicham, Targum Yonatan again has yitrachem, will be willing to give them another chance.
[I know this isn’t the common translation of rachamim, usually rendered compassion or mercy, but R. Mecklenburg means it the way I’ve put it here, as we’re about to see.]
He therefore argues this verse must be read in the context of the one three earlier, where Hashem had said He would give people a hundred and twenty years to mend their ways, despite already deserving destruction. The verse there says vayinachem…ki asah, which we usually read to mean God was nicham that He had created man, where R. Mecklenburg suggests we ought to use ki in another of its meanings, for He had created them.
Creators want their creations to succeed; God’s having created Man was why He gave them more time. God was nicham, gave time to improve, because He had created them.
People Fail To Take the Opportunity
The end of this verse, which seems to say Hashem was sad at heart, and the next, where God does decide to destroy humanity, ki nichamti ki asitim, pose problems for R. Mecklenburg’s reading. With almost the same words, this verse more clearly means something like “for I regret that I made them.” To solve his problem, he fastens on the indeterminacy of libo, his heart, not God’s, the people, how they reacted to the extra time. Instead of improving, they let their evil spread to their hearts. Va-yit’atzev doesn’t mean became sad, he is saying, it means let the sadness/evil affect their innermost beings.
It left no recourse but destruction, Hashem says in the next verse. To cope with the pesky ki nichamti ki asitim, R. Mecklenburg argues this ki uses yet another meaning of the word, despite. Despite having given them time, for I created them, they leave Me no choice.
Sharply different than we are used to, built with alternate readings of nichum, based on Targum Yonatan in two places, and three meanings of the word ki, depending on context. Grammatical insights that showed HaKetav VeHaKabbalah a way to turn regret into length to punish, an example of God’s sense of connection with humanity, His creation.
Themes of the Five
These were not the only interesting comments we saw over the years (I had three good candidates from Rashi, because Rashi is just the best!), but they are five good ones. And, as it happens, they all deal with freewill and what we do with it.
Nature might have had freewill, used it poorly, and gotten punished. People got freewill before they were ready for it, part of the reason its harder for us to conquer ourselves than it was supposed to be. Once we had it, Hashem wants us to know that our sexual ethics affect the earth’s plenty, and that we can and should use this freewill to recognize the correct way to serve God, with the truest appreciation of God’s nature and how to relate to Him. When it all went wrong, God gave us another chance, a hundred and twenty years we wasted, “forcing” Hashem to bring the Flood.
Still, we have freewill, and can do wonders with it, if we use it right.
Here are the other comments I did not again review, but will include in next year’s search for overarching themes:
Ramban, Introduction
Rashi, Bereshit 1;1
Onkelos Bereshit 1;1 on Elokim
Kli Yakar, Bereshit 1;1
Meshech Hochmah Bereshit 1;5
Vilna Gaon, Bereshit, 1;14
Rashi, Bereshit 2;7
Onkelos Bereshit 2;7
Or HaChayyim Bereshit, 3;1
Rashi, Bereshit 3;5
R. David Zvi Hoffmann, Bereshit 3;6
Rashi, Bereshit, 3;22
Rashi, Bereshit 4;2
Meshech Hochmah Bereshit 4; 3-5
Sforno Bereshit 4;6
Ha’amek Davar, Bereshit 4;7
R. Samson Raphael Hirsch, 5;1
Onkelos 5:3
Ibn Ezra, Bereshit, 5;24
Rashi, Bereshit, 5;24